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ARCTIC 
The Drift of Lenin's Convoy in the  Laptev  Sea, 
1937 - 1938 
WILLIAM BARR' 
ABSTRACT. As a result of various miscalculations 25 ships underwent an enforced 
wintering at various points in the Soviet Arctic in the winter of 1937-1938. Among the 
vessels involved was a convoy of six ships led by the icebreaker Lenin, which spent the 
winter drifting in the Laptev Sea. Several of the ships were severely damaged by ice 
pressure, and one ship was crushed and sank. Early in 1938 all superfluous personnel 
were flown south to Tiksi in an emergency airlift operation. The author presents the 
first detailed English-language account of this wintering. 
RkSUMk. A  la suite d'erreurs  de calcul variées, 25 bateaux subissaient un hivernage 
forcé en differents points de l'Arctique Sovietique, lors de l'hiver 1937-1938. Parmi ces 
vaisseaux, un convoi de six bateaux était guidé par le briseglace Lenine'qui passait 
l'hiver à dériver en mer de Laptev. Plusieurs de ces bateaux subissaient des dégats 
sévéres dus à la pression de la glace et un des bateaux se brisait et coulait. Au debut de 
1938, tout le personnel en surnombre était évacué par avion vers le  sud à Tiksi grace à 
une operation aerienne de secours urgent. L'auteur présente ici le premiere 
compte rendu détaillé en langue Anglaise de cet hivernage. 
Traduit par Alain  de Vendigies, Aquitaine Company of Canada Ltd. 
INTRODUCTION 
Only a few months after Sibiryukov's limited success in her attempt at a 
one-season passage of the  Northern  Sea  Route, so eloquently embodied in her 
final emergence from the ice of the Chukchi Sea  under improvised sails (Vize, 
1946; Barr, 1978), on December 17, 1932 Sovnurkom (the Soviet of Peoples' 
Commissars) took the momentous step of forming the Chief Administration of 
the  Northern  Sea  Route (Gluvnoye  Upruvleniye  Severnogo  Morskogo Puli), more 
commonly  known as Gluvsevmorput' (Armstrong, 1959; Belov, 1969). Its 
primary task was to  establish  safe, reliable navigation from the White Sea  to 
Bering Strait,  but in a  series of subsequent  decrees  over  the  next few years  it 
also  acquired  a remarkable array of ancillary functions, and along  with them, 
remarkably wide powers.  In effect Gluvsevmorput' was given almost complete 
control of the entire  vast  area of Siberia north of 62" (the  latitude of Yakutsk) 
not only in terms of transport  and economic development,  but  also  education, 
health services and cultural development. 
Even with these extensive powers, however, the new organization's first 
attempt at demonstrating  that it  was capable of tackling its primary task was a 
disastrous failure. In her attempt at making a one-season passage of the 
Northern Sea Route in the summer of 1933 the steamer Chelyuskin became 
beset  in  the  ice of the Chukchi Sea, and after drifting helplessly for several 
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months, was  ultimately crushed  and sank on February 13, 1934 (Belov, 1969; 
Shmidt et ul . ,  1935). However, the new organization's reputation was 
definitely redeemed the following year when the icebreaker Fedor Litke 
reached Murmansk on September 20, 1934, having succeeded where 
Chelyuskin had so utterly  failed (Vize, 1946). 
Otto Yul'yevich Shmidt, head of Glavsevmorput' from its inception, was 
not slow to build on this first success. In the summer of 1935 Fedor Litke 
escorted the first two laden freighters, Vuntsetti and Iskru, through the Sea 
Route from west to east; sailing from Leningrad on July 8, they reached 
Vladivostok on October 8 (Gakkel', 1936; Belov, 1969). Meanwhile two other 
steamers, Anudyr' and Stulingrud, made the through-passage in the opposite 
direction, sailing  from  Vladivostok on July 23 and 25 and reaching  Leningrad 
on October 16. Moreover, one steamer, Rubochiy , almost made a double 
passage of the  Sea  Route by  completing a round trip from Arkhangel'sk to the 
mouth of the Kolyma and back (Belov, 1969). 
The following season (1936) saw a spectacular increase in  activity  along the 
Northern Sea  Route; a total of 160 ships travelled parts of the  route  (the bulk 
of them from the west to the mouth of the Yenisey  and back), while 16 vessels 
made the through-passage, 14 from west to  east, and 2 from east to west,  the 
latter being Vuntsetti and Iskru homeward bound to Leningrad (Belov, 1969). 
The ships heading east included the first Soviet warships to utilize the 
Northern Sea  Route,  the  destroyers Voykov and Stulin, escorted once again  by 
Fedor Litke (Burkhanov, 1959; Zinger, 1948; Belov, 1969). 
The plans for the 1937 season were equally ambitious, but  by then the run 
of luck had ended. Due to a combination of abnormally severe ice conditions 
and some very unfortunate decisions as  to routing of convoys and deployment 
of icebreakers towards the end of the  season, 25 ships were obliged to winter 
on an emergency basis at various points in the Soviet Arctic (Belov, 1969; 
Stepanov, 1941). Perhaps the most  critical aspect, however, was that of 
Gluvsevmorput"~ fleet of icebreakers; only one, the veteran Yermak was not 
forced to winter in the Arctic. 
The icebreaking steamer Rusanov was obliged to winter at Tikhaya Bukhta 
in  Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa, along  with two freighters. Six Spanish timber ships 
wintered in a sheltered bay near Dikson. The icebreaker Fedor Litke, along 
with four freighters and a tug, spent the winter just off the south coast of 
Ostrov Bol'shevik near the eastern end of Proliv Vil'kitskogo, while the 
icebreaker Krusin was frozen into the fast ice of Bukhta Kozhevnikova in 
Khatangskiy  Zaliv. 
All  of the ships so far mentioned were in  relatively secure winter quarters, 
frozen firmly into immobile fast ice. The situation with  regard to the other two 
groups  of ships was entirely different. The  three icebreaking steamers, Sadko, 
Malygin and Sedov, began their wintering just  to the northwest of 
Novosibirskiye Ostrova, i.e. in the northeastern part of the Laptev  Sea;  and 
finally the icebreaker Lenin, with a convoy of five steamers, began her 
wintering at 74" 28'N; 111" 27'E, just off Ostrov Begicheva in the narrow 
entrance to Khatangskiy  Zaliv. Both of these  latter convoys spent the winter 
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drifting  with the ice, exposed to the very real dangers of ice movement and 
ridging. Strangely, while the drift of Sudko, Malygin and Sedov, and particularly 
that of the latter ship, has been widely  publicized (e.g. Badigin,  1950; 
Buynitskiy,  1945; Armstrong, 1958), the drift  of Lenin and her convoy 
elsewhere in the Laptev  Sea is relatively  little  known. 
Lenin’s convoy had sailed from Dikson, eastward bound, on August 23, 
1937. Apart from the icebreaker herself, commanded by Kapitan Fedor 
Ivanovich  Drigo,  it consisted of the freighters Il’men’, Tovarishch  Stalin, 
Rabochiy and Volodarskiy; and the naval  hydrographic  ship Kamchadal (Ruzov, 
1957; Storozhev, 1940a). The latter vessel, commanded by Kapitan A. M. 
Vershinskiy, was one of three newly built survey vessels (the others being 
Okean and Okhotsk) which were being transferred through the Sea Route for 
hydrographic  work in the Pacific (Belov, 1969). 
The convoy escort Lenin (originally Aleksundr Nevskiy) had been built on the 
Tyne for the Tsarist government  during  World  War I (Armstrong, 1952; 
Zalesskiy, 1972). At 7950 hp she was the third most powerful of the Soviet 
icebreaker fleet, after Yermak and Krasin. She was 85.6 m long,  with a beam of 
19.5 m, a draft of  6.24 m, and a displacement of 5600 tonnes; her top speed 
was 16 knots. Altogether she represented a formidable escort  and  the officers 
and men of the ships of the convoy must have found her presence very 
reassuring. 
The writers  responsible for the two most  detailed accounts of the convoy’s 
wintering were both travelling as passengers on board the steamer ZZ’men‘. 
Both were bound for Mys  Medvezh’iy on  the south coast of Ostrov Kotel’nyy 
in Novosibirskiye Ostrova, where they were to establish and man a new 
weather station, designed  specifically to cover Proliv Sannikova. These were 
the station leader, L. V. Ruzov, and the head of a hydrological group who 
were to work from the station, N. M. Storozhev. 
Eastward bound 
Under the command of Kapitan Nikolayev, Il‘men‘ had  sailed  from 
Arkhangel’sk on August 8 with some 200 passengers on board, including 
women and children (Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 1940a). Apart from the 
personnel for various weather stations these included workers for the port at 
Tiksi.  If one discounts some excitement when a drunken cook jumped 
overboard in the  Kara  Sea, I1’men’’s voyage to Dikson  had been quite 
uneventful; she had reached that port on August 14 without encountering a 
single  ice floe. 
The remainder of the voyage would be very different. The first ice was 
encountered on the day that the convoy sailed from Dikson. Thereafter ice 
conditions became steadily worse, until off Ostrov Russkiy  in the Arkhipelag 
Nordenshel’da on August 30 the convoy was brought to a complete halt in 
heavy ice (Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 1940a; Gakkel’, 1938);  not  until 
September 12 were the ships able to get under way again, eastward bound 
towards Proliv Vil’kitskogo. But by September 15 the convoy was again 
beset, near Zaliv Dika, and had begun drifting with the ice north and east 
towards the strait. 
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During this period the first tragic death to befall Rabochiy had occurred: on 
the 13th her first mate, Pave1 Dzhanorovich Kroche, had. died of a cerebral 
haemorrhage. He was buried at sea on the morning of September 15 at 76” 
43.6’N; 98” 40’E to the strains of the funeral march played by Lenin’s band 
(Gakkel’, 1938). The very next day  there was almost another  death on board 
Tovarishch Stalin. The ship was being subjected to extreme pressures in the 
ice, with  plating and frames undergoing enormous stress, when a rivet sheared 
in the engine room and flew out with explosive force, narrowly missing her 
chief engineer (Ruzov, 1957). 
To  the north of Ostrova Firnleya the ships of the convoy were caught in a 
rapid and persistent easterly drift setting through  Proliv  Vil’kitskogo into the 
Laptev Sea, reaching the amazing speed of 3 knots on occasion. Thus on the 
night of September 24 they were inexorably and helplessly carried eastwards 
past the lights  of the station on Mys  Chelyuskina. The only exception was the 
steamer Volodarskiy , which by some vagary of the ice drift had become 
separated from the  other ships and had become jammed against the edge of 
the fast ice in Bukhta Oskara, just west of Mys Chelyuskina (Storozhev, 
1940a). There she remained until early October, exposed to even worse ice 
pressures than  the remainder  of the convoy; 116 of her frames were damaged 
and she began  leaking severely. Finally, on October 3 the icebreaker Yermak 
came to her rescue, broke her loose, and escorted her west to open water 
(Gakkel’, 1938). Thus, purely  by chance, Volodarskiy was the only one of the 
ships inLenin’s convoy which  did not winter in the Arctic. 
There was  no respite for the other ships, however; east of Mys 
Chelyuskina, near Ostrova Petra, in a terrifying display of force the ice 
pressures snapped 1Z’men”s rudder post, rendering her unsteerable, even if 
she had not been jammed solidly  in the ice (Ruzov, 1957). On October 1 the 
ice began to slacken and Lenin was able to get under way again. She took 
11‘men‘ in tow, then broke loose the battered, leaking Tovarishch”Sta1in near 
Ostrov Andreya (Gakkel’,  1938). The  latter vessel  had lost a propeller  blade 
and was  taking water at  an alarming rate through a massive crack in her plates 
on the starboard side. In  an attempt to stem the flow, the ship was  trimmed 
until she was listing markedly to port, exposing the crack above the water 
line, where it  was then stopped with a wooden patch. 
At this point the battered convoy was joined by the steamer Dikson, which 
was actually westward bound but which clearly had no chance of reaching 
Proliv Vil’kitskogo on her own (Ruzov, 1957; Gakkel’, 1938). Escorted by 
Malygin she had  sailed  from Dikson, eastward  bound,  on August 1, had passed 
Mys Chelyuskina escorted by Yermuk a few days  later, and having  discharged 
her cargo at Nordvik, was now attempting, without  much hope of success, to 
fight her way back west again. She was empty and Kapitan Drigo took 
advantage of her arrival to transship 432 tonnes of freight to her  from 
Tovarishch  Stalin to ease the strain on the latter’s damaged hull (Gakkel’, 
1938). 
Ice conditions again  began to deteriorate and with coal supplies  running  low 
and Lenin’s manoeuverability greatly compromised by her having Il’men’ in 
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tow,  the  situation was  becoming critical.  The  icebreaker Krusin, commanded 
by Kapitan M. P.  Belousov, which had been searching the Beaufort Sea  for 
the missing pilot Levanevskiy, and which was then lying at Chaunskaya 
Guba, was ordered to go to Lenin’s assistance. Filling  his bunkers  to capacity 
Belousov took his ship to sea from Chaunskaya Guba on October 5 ,  and 
headed west at top  speed. Despite heavy ice in the  Laptev  Sea Krusin reached 
Lenin’s convoy, now  lying  off Bukhta Pronchishchevoy,  on  October 20 
(Storozhev, 1940a; Ruzov, 1957; Gakkel’, 1938). 
But reaching the convoy was  only half the battle, and it  was a total 
impossibility for Belousov to win the  rest of the  battle; due to  the heavy ice 
she had encountered, Krusin had consumed so much coal that  she did not have 
enough left to reach Bering Strait,  or  even Dikson. A meeting of the officers 
of both icebreakers and the captains of all the freighters was convened on 
board Krusin that same  day (October 20) and it was reluctantly agreed that  the 
only feasible  option was to  attempt  to reach a  secure wintering site  at Bukhta 
Kozhevnikova in Khatangskiy Zaliv; there were outcrops of coal there, and it 
was hoped that the men could mine enough coal to ensure the convoy’s 
mobility in the spring. Digging into his meagre reserves Kapitan Belousov 
transferred some coal to the ships which were in the direst need, and next 
morning the  convoy again got under way, southward  bound. 
Krusin led the way, while Lenin again took Il’men’ in tow. On the first day 
the ships covered 32 km; the next day 72. Then Belousov decided to change 
his tactics: he split the  convoy  into  two  groups,-escorting  each group of ships 
south  alternately in relays of  16  km (Ruzov, 1957). 
On October 28 the high, rocky mass of Ostrov  Preobrazheniya hove into 
view;  with the island still abeam a  startling radio message  was received from 
Gluvsevmorput‘ headquarters in Moscow: Kapitan Belousov was ordered to 
abandon Lenin’s convoy and to proceed instead to the assistance of Sedov, 
Mulygin and Sudko, jammed and drifting, to the  northwest of Ostrov 
Kotel’nyy. The  authorities in Moscow were clearly totally out of touch with 
reality, in that the message ended with the comment that Lenin and her 
crippled convoy were “permitted  to  proceed  to  Bukhta  Kozhevnikova”.  The 
order was subsequently  countermanded. 
On November 1 , with the convoy abeam of Ostrov Bol’shoy Begichev, 
Krusin pushed  ahead on a  reconnaissance  but was able to  advance only 13  km 
in 10 hours. When she  returned to the  convoy  a meeting  was called on board 
Lenin, attended by all captains and chief engineers. It was decided that all 
excess personnel, totalling some 250 people including the sick, women and 
children, would transfer  to Krusin, leaving 224 men on board the six ships of 
the  convoy. They would then winter where they lay,  i.e. in the narrow neck of 
Khatangskiy Zaliv off Ostrov Bol’shoy Begichev, at 74” 28’N; 111” 27’E, 
while Krusin retreated  to  the  greater  security of Bukhta  Kozhevnikova. 
After theaeeting Tovurishch Stulin’s captain,  Kapitan Panfilov, returned  to 
his ship immediately, but  other  participants, including Tovurishch Stulin’s chief 
engineer, and the  captains  and chief engineers of both Rubochiy and Kumchadal 
lingered on board Lenin. Due to the onset of severe ice movements, which 
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made travel across  the ice hazardous, their visit lasted much  longer than they 
had contemplated (Ruzov, 1957). 
Implementation of the decisions reached at the meeting  began  immediately. 
To feed the extra passengers during the winter, Krasin took a quantity of 
provisions  from Rabochiy; then  on the night  of November 4 she pulled 
alongside Illmen’ and took off 500 tonnes of cargo, in part to lighten the 
freighter. Meanwhile temporary bunks were being erected in Krasin’s empty 
holds and  even her bunkers. Next  day, with  all the superfluous personnel on 
board, Krasin departed, to  the sound of  farewell  whistle blasts (Ruzov, 1957). 
Wintering 
On board the six  ships  of the convoy engineers and firemen  began 
“moth-balling” the engines and machinery for the winter. Since coal reserves 
were extremely limited, the boilers were kept fired and the steam heating 
operational only on board Lenin; the crews of the other ships had to be 
content with stoves (Storozhev, 1940a).  Although  little  was  known about  the 
winter ice regime of the Laptev Sea it was known that final freeze-up of 
Khatangskiy Zaliv  was  still several weeks away,  and  it was hoped that in the 
interim the ships would remain approximately stationary, to become safely 
embedded in the fast ice for the winter. But this was not to be; under the 
impact of a southwesterly gale on the night of November 16 the  ice,  and  the 
ships with it, were carried out of the mouth of Khatangskiy Zaliv into the 
wider expanses of the Laptev Sea (Storozhev, 1940a). The convoy was thus 
committed to wintering  adrift  in the pack. 
Most of the ships of the convoy maintained approximately the same 
positions relative to each other. With her bow snubbed hard against Lenin’s 
stern, Illmen‘ had little choice but to stay with the icebreaker. Dikson was 
jammed in the ice only about 1.5 km away; on the initiative of her captain, 
Anisim  Zinov’yevich Filatov, she was  linked to the icebreaker by telephone, 
and Lenin’s generator even supplied  h&  with power, except when ice 
movements occasionally cut the line (Ruzov, 1957). Rabochiy and Kamchadal 
lay close together about 10 km away, usually to the southwest. In contrast to 
all these, Tovarishch Stalin tended to go her own way. Due to the vagaries of 
the ice drift she lingered for a long time near the northern tip of Ostrov 
Bol’shoy Begichev, alternately being frozen into the fast ice and breaking 
away again. Thus she fell  well  behind the other  steamers, which  drifted  more 
steadily northeastwards. As a result by late January Tovarishch Stulin lay about 
240  km southwest of Lenin, but by  March this distance had closed to about 70 
km (Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 1940a). 
At a very early stage in the wintering,  indeed even prior to the  start of the 
drift, it was  realized that the situation could be turned to some advantage by 
establishing a full  programme of scientific observations. Thus on November 4 
fourteen of the scientific personnel bound  originally for various polar stations 
transferred from Il‘men’ to establish a drifting scientific station under the 
leadership of L. V.  Ruzov (Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 1940a). They included 
two hydrologists, a hydro-technician, a geodesist, a zoologist, a 
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meteorologist, a hydrographer, an actinometrist, a laboratory technician, a 
radio technician, an engineer, and even two dog drivers. 
According to  Ruzov,  the  reception  they were given by Kapitan Drigo and 
Lenin’s doctor was somewhat cool and the  quarters assigned to them were less 
than satisfactory. Eight of them were housed in a  “cabin” only 8 mz  in area, 
while the  rest bunked with Lenin’s stokers.  First  priority, in terms of available 
manpower, was given to so-called “emergency work”,  i.e.  transshipment of 
provisions and fuel from Illmen‘ to Lenin. The scientists were not exempted 
from this  work, and hence it  was November 14 before scientific observations 
could begin. 
On that date meteorologists P. A. Oliv and B. S .  Mikhaylov began their 
hourly observations which would continue all winter, while the hydrologists 
inaugurated a programme of ice observations, the observations being made 
from Lenin’s bridge. Observations  on ice drift began on November 18 
(Storozhev, 1940a),  with  hourly readings on  speed  and  direction of drift. The 
results, spanning the  entire period of the  drift, were later analysed in detail by 
Storozhev (1940b). Initially the  measurements  were made through  an ice-hole 
sheltered by a canvas tent, some 150 m from the starboard side of the 
icebreaker. This arrangement was found to be unsatisfactory,  however, since 
the hole froze  over rapidly as temperatures  dropped. 
Hence it was decided to build a more substantial hydrologic “pavilion”: a 
plywood hut,  4 m by 2.5 m and 2.2 m high, floored with wood and  entirely 
covered with canvas; it stood 250 m from the icebreaker’s starboard side. 
Two holes in the floor gave  access  to  the  sea, and the hut was equipped with 
tables,  chairs and bunks,  heated with a coal-burning stove  and lit  by kerosene 
lamps (Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 1940a). The hydrological observations were 
transferred to this hut on November 24 and thereafter hourly observations 
were  carried  out round the  clock; drift velocity and direction  were determined 
by means of a 16-kg weight lowered to  the  seabed  on a wire cable.  It should 
be noted that  the  Laptev  Sea  is  extremely shallow (averaging about 45 m in 
the  area of the convoy’s drift), hence this simple procedure gave quite reliable 
results. A total of over 50 seabed cores,  about 30  cm  in length, were taken for 
subsequent  analysis, with a spacing of  9- 11 km. 
To  break  the monotony of the hydrologists’ cold, lonely vigil, they 
occasionally had visitors.  Storozhev (1940a) has reported  that  on  February 6, 
1938, he had just finished a  set of drift  measurements and was sitting working 
up the  results, when the  water level in one of the ice-holes began to oscillate 
violently,  and  the head of a walrus appeared,  to his considerable 
consternation. As he grabbed for a rifle the walrus dived, drenching the 
interior of the  hut.  Next day two of the  other  scientists, Yu. M. Bartashevich 
and A. I. Morozov, were taking temperature and current  measurements, when 
something appeared to become tangled in their cable. Then a walrus again 
surfaced several times, alternating between the two holes. The scientists 
retaliated,  first with an axe,  then with rifle shots,  but  the walrus got away. 
The end result was that  the  interior of the hut  was  again drenched and also 
liberally spattered with blood, while most of the  furniture was overturned  in 
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the melee. Seals were also quite frequent  visitors to the  ice-holes, to the point 
of becoming a  nuisance, and had to be driven away. 
During their period of observation, Storozhev and his group made 2020 
observations  on ice drift, 1224 on  currents, 408 measurements of temperature 
and salinity at various depths, 500 soundings, 100 measurements of ice 
thickness, and 137 observations on ice pressure and slackening. Their work 
was co-ordinated with the meteorologists’ observations and with the 
determinations of position made  by Lenin’s navigation officers.  The navigators 
determined 385 astronomical fixes on the  ship’s  position. 
As noted earlier, the captains and engineers of Kamchadal, Rabochiy and 
Tovarishch Stalin had been involuntary guests on board Lenin since early 
November when they had come on board for  a meeting, but had been unable 
to return due to the sudden onset of severe ice movements. But when on 
November 24 G. L. Rutilevskiy and dog driver F. A. Nikolayev made a sledge 
trip  to Ostrov Preobrazheniya  less than 20 km away, an attempt which was 
only foiled by open water close to shore, the captive officers realized the 
possibilities of returning to  their ships by the same means of transport.  Hence 
on November 28 Rutilevskiy and Nikolayev set off with their dogteams, 
escorting  Kapitan Vershinskiy and his four sailors who  had also been stranded 
with him on  board Lenin, back  to Kamchadal. The trip was entirely  successful. 
Encouraged by this, two of the  other officers on  board Lenin, M. Strelkov and 
D.N. Sergiyevskiy, both from Rabochiy, also  set off by dogteam for  their own 
ships On December 10; although they broke through the ice on the f i s t  
attempt and had to return, Rutilevskiy delivered them safely to their ships the 
following day (Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 1940a). Since Tovarishch Stulin was 
drifting independently a  considerable  distance from the  rest of the  convoy,  her 
chief engineer was unable to return  to his ship until  April  2, during the airlift 
of excess  personnel from the  convoy. 
As always during an arctic wintering, particularly an enforced one with 
large numbers of surplus personnel on board the  ships,  the problem of keeping 
the men occupied was an acute one. It was solved in part by a regular 
schedule of classes  on board the various ships,  and especially on  board Lenin. 
The men on board the  icebreaker (and the  adjacent ZI’men’) had the decided 
advantage of an  excellent  library,  because  comprehensive  libraries had been 
included in  the  inventories of the polar stations which Zl’men’ and Lenin were 
to have established.  They  also had the  services of a wide range of scientists 
readily available for instruction. Classes focussed on mathematics, English 
language, the history of the  Party, etc. The  scientists  also  presented 
general-interest lectures on their own fields to the ships’ personnel. Movies 
were  shown  on board Lenin and Kamchadal, and there were amateur  variety 
evenings from time to time. Chess, billiards and dominoes were all very 
In an attempt to maintain the men’s physical health, various outdoor 
activities were encouraged.  These included games of soccer  on  the ice 
(Storozhev, 1940a). But the outdoor activity which seems to have aroused 
most interest was fox  trapping. The various trapping “artels” were allocated 
popular. 
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specific areas  for their traplines. Some of them,  and particularly the  “artel” 
consisting of G .  L. Rutilevskiy and Oliv, were extremely  successful. A total 
of 60 foxes was caught during the winter. Occasionally both bait and trapped 
foxes were lost  to polar bears, but  no polar bears  were  shot. 
On December 17 a large herd of walrus was discovered in a polynya near 
the  icebreaker.  There was a full moon and hence Rutilevskiy, Nikolayev and 
Storozhev decided to try some  hunting (Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 1940a). 
Despite the terrifyingly aggressive behaviour of the massed walrus they 
managed to  shoot  and  recover five animals over  a period of two  days.  They 
made an extremely welcome contribution  to  the menu. 
Sinking of Rabochiy 
Inevitably all of the  ships, with the possible exception of Lenin, ran a real 
risk of being severely damaged or  even  crushed by ice pressures, particularly 
since  several of them had been badly weakened in their  earlier drift through 
Proliv Vil’kitskogo. Thus, as early as November 5 Rabochiy was subjected to  a 
severe nip which badly dented her hull, breaking numerous frames, loosening 
rivets,and leaving her  with a  serious leak (Storozhev, 1940a). As a 
precautionary  measure  both  she and Kamchadal were partially unloaded and 
their  cargoes  stacked  on  the  ice. The rationale behind this was that with the 
draft of the ships reduced the ice  would  more readily slide beneath  their hulls 
rather  than crushing them. During January 1938 Kapitan Panfilov of 
Tovarishch Stalin reported extreme ice pressures around his ship; drifting on 
her own some 240  km southwest of the  other  ships,  and  at  that ime  some 100 
km from the  nearest  land,  Ostrov  Preobrazheniya,  she was the most 
FIG. 1. Laptev Sea, showing drift ofLenin’s convoy with dates. 
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vulnerable  of  all to ice attack. As a precaution a depot of emergency supplies 
was established on the ice near the ship. 
Even Il'men', lashed to Lenin's stern, was not spared the dangers of ice 
pressure. On the evening of January 4,  the towing cables by  which she was 
made fast snapped like so many  guitar strings. Il'men' travelled  slowly down 
the icebreaker's port side, carried along  by an advancing pressure ridge 
(Storozhev, 1940a).  All the equipment  was  hurriedly rescued from the 
hydrological hut, and it  was  almost a week  before  it  was felt that ice 
conditions were stable enough  for observations to resume. 
On January 20 violent ice movements  began around Rabochiy and 
Kamchadal, resulting  in a major dent in Rabochiy's port side. The movements 
continued throughout the next few days, then at 1.00 A.M. on the 23rd a 
massive  ridge  some 4 m high  overwhelmed the ship's port side. Huge  blocks 
of ice tumbled over the rail while beneath the waterline the hull was sliced 
open from the engine room bulkhead aft to the stern. Large amounts of ice 
were forced inside the hull  through  this  gaping  hole (Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 
1940a). 
The crews of Rabochiy and Kamchadal began  working  feverishly to unload as 
much of Rabochiy's cargo as possible onto the ice. The freight which was 
unloaded  included  150 cases of matches, and by a quirk of fate an advancing 
ice ridge produced sufficient  friction to ignite them, resulting  in a spectacular 
blaze. The flames  could be easily seen from Lenin over 20 km away. As his 
ship slowly settled by the  stern, Kapitan Sergeyevskiy stepped onto the ice at 
7.30  A.M. The ice  then  began to slacken,  and  the  stern slowly sank beneath 
the water. At 9.00 A.M. the stern touched bottom while the bow, still 
supported by the ice, pointed skywards. Then, with the ice slackening further, 
the bow went under. All that was left were the stacks of salvaged cargo, 
totalling  some 200 tonnes. 
Rabochiy's crew of  25 took refuge on board Kamchudal, lying only some 400 
m away. Then it was  decided to transport part of the salvaged cargo to Lenin. 
Zoologist G. L. Rutilevskiy  played a major role in this very demanding 
operation. A trail  was  laid out and marked between Kamchadal and Lenin and a 
tent set  up  at  the halfway point. Dog teams and manhauled  sledges were used 
to move the cargo, with a total of 95 men from the crews of Kamchadal, 
Rabochiy, Lenin, Il'men' and Dikson being involved. Apart from the sledge 
teams other men were kept employed  in  maintaining and relocating the trail 
where it had been interrupted by pressure ridges or leads. The work of 
marking the trail began on January 25,  while  movement of freight  began on 
the 28th and continued until  March 5 despite temperatures as low as -40" C. 
By the end of the operation 50 tonnes of assorted goods, mainly canned 
goods, cigarettes, and clothing, had been salvaged and stowed in Lenin's holds 
(Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 1940a). 
Airlijt 
The drifting ships were still  moving steadily farther  northeastwards; thus by 
March 1 Lenin's position  was  75" 47'N; 123" 31'E. In view of this, and 
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particularly in view of the  loss of Rabochiy, it  was decided,  just as in the  better 
known case of Sadko, Sedov and Malygin, to evacuate all surplus  personnel by 
air.  The  sun had appeared  above  the horizon again  on February  9,  and thus 
there was now sufficient daylight for  the work of preparing airstrips on the 
ice. The main one was located near the steamer Dikson, while the crew of 
Tovarishch Stulin built another near their ship.  Explosives were used to blast 
away pressure ridges and hummocks, and at the cost of a vast amount of 
back-breaking labour, two functional airstrips were produced. But when the 
arrival of the planes was delayed, ice movements resulted in the formation of 
cracks and the growth of new ridges across the strips. These had to be 
repeatedly levelled and the hollows  filled  in (Ruzov, 1957). 
The  first  a tempt  an  evacuation flight  was  made  by Sergey 
Aleksandrovich Asyamov, flying from Ust’-Olenek  in  a light  P-6 aircraft  on 
February 16 (Shtepenko, 1953).  At this point the drifting convoy was 350 km 
away; Lenin’s radio was transmitting at full power, but the plane was not 
equipped with a radio direction finder and despite  the  best  effort of Asyamov 
and his navigator they were unable to locate  the  ships  on this first  attempt. 
Indeed  they barely managed to get back to Ust’-Olenek on the  last  drops of 
fuel. Asyamov then flew east to Tiksi where two  other P-6 aircraft, piloted by 
Shpakov  and Dmitriyev, had arrived; like Asyamov’s machine, they normally 
operated on the Lena route, carrying mail and a few passengers. Asyamov 
managed to locate and instal a radio direction finder and,on March 8 the  three 
planes took off, flying in a wedge formation. The distance  to  the drifting ships 
was  now about 500 km,  but this time they located them with relative  ease and 
landed safely on the airstrip near Dikson (Shtepenko, 1953; Ruzov, 1957; 
Storozhev, 1940a).  On this  first trip 22 people were evacuated including  all the 
women who had remained with the convoy-a fitting gesture  on  International 
Women’s Day. 
Having safely delivered their  passengers to Tiksi,  the planes returned to the 
convoy  the following day. Among those  to  be  evacuated  that  day were Ruzov 
and  the various other  scientists who  had been manning the scientific drifting 
station, to the  considerable disgust of  all concerned.  Early in February 
Kapitan Drigo relayed an order from the authorities in Moscow that the 
scientific programme should be discontinued and  that  the  scientists involved 
should be  evacuated along with all the  other  surplus  personnel. Despite very 
strong  protests as to  the inadvisability of abandoning such a valuable scientific 
programme, Kapitan Drigo remained adamant. But as a minor concession he 
permitted Storozhev to transfer to Kumchudul and to continue the scientific 
programme in an abbreviated form from there (Storozhev, 1940a). Kapitan 
Vershinskiy was extremely sympathetic, not only arguing on Storozhev’s 
behalf  with Kapitan Drigo, but even assigning all three of  his lieutenants  and 
two  seamen to assist with the  observations.  Transfer of operations  to 
Kamchadal was far from easy;  she was still some 20 km from Lenin and ice 
movements in  early March  had resulted in a large number of new leads  and 
polynyas.  Nonetheless  on March 12 Storozhev and Nikolayev, with two dog 
teams, managed to  ferry  about half the  necessary  equipment  to Kamchadal, 
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although barely  frozen leads and large polynyas occasioned  extensive  detours. 
The remainder of the equipment was transferred to Kumchudul in another 
sledge trip  on  the 16th, and having  built a plywood hydrological pavilion, on 
the 18th Storozhev was able triumphantly to resume his interrupted hourly 
observations on  ice drift (Ruzov, 1957; Storozhev, 1940a). 
But his satisfaction was shortlived; on the 20th a radio message  was 
received from the  “polyarniki on Ulitsa Razina” as Ruzov scathingly calls the 
headquarters staff of Gluvsevniorput’ in Moscow, insisting categorically that all 
scientists  be airlifted south. As yet another small concession,  however, 
Storozhev was able to hand over all his equipment to Kapitan Vershinskiy 
and his lieutenants, whom he quickly instructed in the  use of  all the 
equipment. They thus  were able to  continue  the scientific programme  until the 
end of the drift (Storozhev, 1940a; Ruzov, 1957). Since there was no suitable 
site  for building an airstrip  near Kumchudul, Storozhev, along with 15 of the 
ship’s crew who were also scheduled to be evacuated, once again hiked 
across  the ice to Lenin. 
As already mentioned the remainder of Storozhev’s scientific group, led by 
Ruzov, had been  evacuated by Asyamov’s group of planes on March 9 and 
10. In total, in three successful trips to the convoy Asyamov and his 
colleagues airlifted 70 people from the drifting ships to Tiksi, where they were 
accommodated temporarily on barges. Thereafter, however, a spell of bad 
weather  interrupted  the airlift operation. 
By this time (mid-March) Lenin’s convoy had drifted to  a position more than 
600 km from Tiksi, and this meant that the P-6 aircraft were approaching 
dangerously close to the limits of their range (Shtepenko, 1953). But help was 
on  the  way.  Veteran  arctic pilot A. D. Alekseyev, who  had been among the 
pilots who had landed at  the  North Pole to establish Papanin’s Severnyy Polyus 
I drifting station  the  previous May, flew in from Moscow  with three of the big 
orange-coloured planes which had taken part in that operation. They were 
ANT-6’s, large four-engined machines designed by  A. N. Tupelov and 
specially adapted for arctic operations. Also among the reinforcements to 
arrive at Tiksi were three relatively heavy twin-engined planes piloted by 
Grigoriy Yefimovich Kupchin, V. N. Zadkov and Ye.  N. Nikolayev. All these 
aircraft, including Asyamov’s three P-6 machines, were operated by 
G1uvsevmorput”s own Upravleniye Vozdushnoy Sluzhby (Air Service 
Administration). 
Alekseyev’s three  aircraft were assigned to  evacuating superfluous 
personnel from Sadko, Sedov and Mulygin, drifting  in the  northern  part of the 
Laptev sea; Kupchin’s machines were assigned to the airlift from Lenin’s 
convoy begun by the P-6’s; while the P-6’s were to ferry the evacuated 
personnel south from Tiksi to  Yakutsk. 
During the  latter  part of March bad weather  prevented Kupchin’s planes 
from flying out to the convoy; unfortunately, too, this bad weather was 
accompanied by intense ice movements which completely destroyed  the 
airstrip  near Dikson, so that  a new strip had to be frantically cleared 
(Storozhev, 1940a).  By  April 2, however,  the  weather had cleared  and all the 
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planes at Tiksi were able to take off Kupchin and his companions located  the 
drifting convoy without too much  difficulty and at 11.00 A.M. the  three planes 
touched down safely on the new strip. A tent had been set up near  the  strip 
and here one of the ships’ cooks supplied the  aircraft  crews and the outgoing 
personnel with breakfast.  Shtepenko, Kupchin’s radio operator and navigator 
was particularly impressed by the  order  and organization which prevailed. 
After only a brief stop Zadkov took ob again to fly to Tovurishch Stulin; the 
latter’s chief engineer grasped this  opportunity  to  return  to his ship  after  an 
absence of 4% months (Storozhev, 1940a). Landing safely on Tovarishch 
Stulin’s airstrip some 20 minutes later, Zadkov loaded as many of her outgoing 
personnel as possible, including several sick men,  and taking off, set  a  course 
directly back to Tiksi. At 1.00 P.M. Nikolayev and Kupchin took off from 
Lenin’s airstrip;  the  latter in  his zeal had taken on two passengers more than 
had been scheduled,  and barely cleared  the  pressure ridge at  the end of the 
strip. Moments later he received a wireless message from Lenin: “Superb 
take-off. Come back tomorow for the splinters from your skis. The crew is 
picking them up from the ice hummocks right now” (Shtepenko, 1953, p. 
1 29). 
Next day the planes were back again; this time Storozhev and zoologist 
Rutilevskiy were among the  passengers. As the  planes headed back  south to 
Tiksi the weather deteriorated abruptly and all three planes had to make 
emergency landings on  lakes  or  rivers in various parts of the  Lena  delta. No 
planes were damaged and there were no injuries, although passengers and 
crews were obliged to spend one night, or in some cases two nights in the 
open, huddled around driftwood fires, before the  weather  cleared sufficiently 
for them to take off and fly to Tiksi. Asyamov, returning to Tiksi from a flight 
to Yakutsk,  landed safely on Tiksi airstrip, but got lost while taxiing to  the 
airport buildings and had to spend the night in his aircraft  (Shtepenko, 1953). 
After a period of foul weather Kupchin managed to take advantage of a 
brief fine period to fly out  to  the iconvoy again. While  his plane was  in the air 
Kapitan Drigo reported  that  cracks had developed  in  the  airstrip;  rather  than 
turn  back Kupchin decided to  try  to  evacuate  the  last 10 men scheduled to  be 
airlifted from Tovurishch Stulin. Her  airstrip,  too, was starting  to  crack  up,  but 
he  managed to land safely. He and his crew were so disturbed by the 
appearance of the  ship, which  was listing heavily and still had a large hole  in 
her side,  that Kupchin attempted  to  persuade  Kapitan Panfllov that his ship 
should be evacuated completely; the captain refused pointblank. With the 
airstrip practically disintegrating around his machine, Kupchin made a 
successful take-off. 
It was now mid-April but a prolonged succession of blizzards kept the 
planes grounded at Tiksi. The ships meanwhile were drifting steadily 
northwestwards,  beyond flying range from  Tiksi.  In  response to this  situation 
an intermediate  base was established at the old settlement of Sagastyr’  on  the 
northern edge of the delta (Shtepenko, 1953). After Kupchin’s planes had 
moved there,  ten  days of blizzards kept them pinned down. Finally,  late in 
April a  break in the  weather allowed them to fly north on  their  last  trip;  one 
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flight  by  all three planes should see the operation completed. Two  new 
airstrips had been constructed near Lenin, but while the planes were in the air, 
one of them  broke  up  due to ice movements. A safe  landing  was  made on  the 
alternate strip, but here too pressure ridges and pinnacles began to heave 
upwards  while the planes sat on the ice, waiting for their passengers. The men 
were quickly  bundled aboard,  the pilots lost no time  in  taking  off and headed 
south to Sagastyr' and Tiksi; the airlift operation was complete. 
The  Final Months 
Until  March 6,1938 Lenin's drift  had  displayed a strong easterly component, 
on that date reaching 125"E (Belov, 1969), but then there was a marked 
change. From then,on the ships drifted rapidly northwest. This movement 
culminated  in  their  reaching  their  highest latitude, 78"N, at 113" 51'E, i.e. not 
far to the east of Ostrov Malyy Taymyr in mid-June. Thereafter the drift 
direction  again  changed drastically, and throughout July the ships were 
drifting southeast. 
The  task of  freeing Lenin and her convoy from the ice had been assigned to 
Krasin, wintering near Kozhevnikovo. Although the latter ship had not run the 
risks  of a wintering  adrift  it  had  still  not  been an easy winter for her 
passengers and  crew.  It had been planned to bunker the icebreaker from the 
local  coal  seams and to this end an ice-road 78 km long  was  built  from the coal 
mine to where Krasin lay beset in the fast ice.  Only 25 of the icebreaker's crew 
remained on board; ther remainder of her personnel moved ashore into 
barracks which they shared with workers from Nordvikstroy. They spent most 
of the winter underground, mining coal, or else in  maintaining the ice road via 
FIG. 2. The icebreaker Lenin, after being renamed Vfadimir Ii'ich when the nuclear-powered 
icebreaker Lenin, came into service in 1960. Photo courtesy Mr. Boris Lemachko and Mr. 
Edward Wilson. 
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FIG. 3. The icebreaker Krasin (originally Svyatogor) leaving  the  Tyne after  her launch in 
1916. Photo  courtesy Armstrong  Whitworth& Co. and Mr. Edward  Wilson. 
which tractors hauled the coal to  the  icebreaker. By June 21 when the ice road 
became impassable, Krasin's bunkers were full; 2862 tonnes of coal had been 
mined and hauled out to the ship (Belov, 1969). 
Work now began on getting the ship ready for sea. By judicious use of 
dynamite Krasin had been freed from the ice by  May  16, but it  was not until 
July 12, 1938, with breakup of the ice in Khatangskiy Zaliv that Kapitan 
Belousov took his  ship to sea  (Stepanov, 1941). Having called at Tiksi to load 
even more coal for bunkering the drifting ships, he set a course northwest 
across the  Laptev  Sea (Belov, 1969). Krasin reached and liberated Tovarishch 
Stalin on August 3,  and Kamchadal, Lenin, Il'men' and Dikson on  August 4 and 
5.  Coal, provisions and extra men were transferred to each of the ships in 
turn, and on August 7 the  two icebreakers led the  rest of the  ships  out to the 
edge of the ice. All  six vessels reached Tiksi safely on the 1 lth. 
Assessment 
Many mistakes had been made  in the disposition of freighters and 
icebreakers in the closing weeks of the 1937 navigation season. Probably 
potentially the 'most dangerous was the decision to leave Lenin and  her convoy 
to winter in the entrance of Khatangskiy Zaliv. The risks involved were 
considerably greater than those faced by the other group of ships which 
wintered adrift, namely Sadko, Sedov and Malygin. These were all specially 
designed ice-strengthened freighters, indeed icebreakers in all but name. By 
contrast all the ships in Lenin's convoy were conventional thin-skinned 
freighters. It is surprising that only one ship  was crushed. 
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One can feel  only admiration for  the efforts of the Soviet seamen, scientists 
and pilots to remedy the situation provoked by the blunders of the “polyarniki 
on Ulitsa Razina”.  The salvage operation aimed at saving the  stores from the 
sunken Rabochiy; the building and repeated rebuilding of the airstrips on the 
ice; the superb air evacuation carried out by Asyamov, Kupchin and their 
colleagues; even the coaling of the icebreaker Krasin during the wintering, 
represented magnificently stubborn achievements. 
In terms of scientific results the drift of Lenin’s convoy  was far from being a 
total loss. Through the diligent efforts of Ruzov,  Storozhev, Rutilevskiy and 
other  scientists, major pioneer contributions were made in terms of the basic 
hydrography, hydrology, meteorology and zoology of the Laptev Sea. Of 
particular value  was the coincidence in  time of the drift of this convoy,  that of 
Sadko’s farther north in the Laptev Sea, and  that of Papanin’s  drifting station 
Severnyy  Polyus I in the Greenland Sea during the same winter, thus providing 
a more complete overview of meteorological and ice  drift patterns. The 
reduction in intensity of the scientific  programme from April onwards with the 
insistence of the authorities of Glavsevmorput‘ that all the scientists be 
evacuated during the airlift is regrettable. However,  to make a fair assessment 
of that decision, one would  need to be  aware of the  entire range of 
circumstances affecting it. 
On a different level, the drift of Lenin’s convoy and the loss of Rabochiy, 
along with the difficulties posed by the enforced wintering of all the other 
ships, specifically the total disruption of plans for  the 1938 season  due to the 
need to rescue all the icebound ships before operations could  begin, resulted 
in a drastic curtailment of the powers of Glavsevmorput‘ and a wholesale 
purging of its ranks - on the assumption that such a large-scale disaster could 
only have been the result of deliberate sabotage. Somehow 0. Yu. Shmidt 
managed to retain his  position as head of the organization but many others,  at 
all levels, went to the wall.  Among the  senior personnel E. F. Krastin, Deputy 
Head of Glavsevmorput‘ and Head of the Administration of Marine and River 
Transport, S. A. Bergavinov, Head of Political Administration, and P. V. 
Orlovskiy, Head of the Hydrographic Administration (Armstrong, 1952) were 
all branded enemies of the people and dismissed. The veteran arctic geologist 
R. L. Samoylovich, Director of the Arkticheskiy Institut was tried on a 
similar charge and acquitted, but his health was seriously impaired and he 
died soon afterwards (Simmons, 1965). 
Measures designed to ensure  that this sort of disaster could not recur were 
spelled out in a resolution of Sovnarkom of August 29, 1938 which specified 
that Glavsevmorput’ should concentrate  on  its primary function,  that of arctic 
sea transport. In terms of its sphere of control, the organization’s territory 
was limited simply to the coastal areas of the arctic mainland and to the 
islands. On the assumption that much of the previous inefficiency, 
culminating in the 1937 debacle, had been due  to its unwieldy  organizational 
structure, Glavsevmorput’ was stripped of practically every function not related 
directly to operation of the Northern Sea Route (Armstrong, 1952; Belov, 
1969). Thus,  for example, its commercial trading operations were transferred 
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to Nurkomtorg (Peoples’ Commissariat for  Trade), Tsentrosoyuz, (Central 
Co-operative Organization) and Dul’stroy (Chief  Administration for 
Construction in the Far  North); farms and stockraising to  the RSFSR 
Nurkomzem (Peoples’ Commissariat for Agriculture); its fishing operations and 
its  fish canneries at Anadyr’ and Ust’-Yeniseysk to Nurkompishcheprom 
(Peoples’ Commissariat for Food Industries); its fur-trapping stations  and  its 
massive fur-marketing operation to Tsentrosoyuz and Dul’stroy; the Kara Sea 
convoy operations (with the exception of the provision of icebreakers and 
pilots) to Nurkomvneshtorg; river transport  on  the Ob’, Taz,  Pur  and Yenisey to 
Nurkomvod (Peoples’ Commissariat for Water Transport);  its Ob’ and Yenisey 
air services and radio stations, with the exception of those along the  Northern 
Sea  Route, to Glavnoye Upravleniye Gosudarstvennogo Vozdushnogo Flota 
(Chief  Administration of the  State Air Line);  and weather stations (again  with 
the exception of those along the  Northern  Sea Route) to Glavnoye 
Upravleniye Gidrometorologicheskoy Sluzhby (Chief Administratiqn of the 
Hydrometeorological Service (Belov, 1969). Responsibility for educption and 
cultural activities north of 62” was  handed over to the aqpropriate 
commissariats of the political  units concerned. 
To emphasize the new focus of this streamlined Gluvsevmorput‘ &e of the 
resolutions passed at  the Eighteenth Party Congress in  March 1939 qoncerned 
the objective of “turning the Northern Sea Route  into a normally operating 
waterway, providing  regular communication with the  Far  East by the end of 
the third five-year plan’.’ (Belov, 1969:103; Armstrong, 195259). However,  it 
should be noted that even now, while the USSR has indeed achieved the 
capability of moving ships right  through the  Northern  Sea  Route safely in any 
navigation season, movement of tonnage to and from the mouths of the  great 
Siberian rivers (i.e.  along  only sections of the  Sea Route) is of vastly greater 
volume and importance than  that of ships making the through-passage. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I should like to thank Mr. Keith Bigelow and Mr. Stanley Hingston for the excellent 
map they provided to illustrate this article. 
20 WILLIAM BARR 
REFERENCES 
ARMSTRONG, T. E. 1952. The Northern Sea Route: Soviet exploitation of the  Northeast 
ARMSTRONG, T. E. 1958. The Russians in the  Arctic.  London: Methuen. 
BADIGIN, K. S.  1950. Tri zimovki vo I’dakh Arktiki [Three winters in the  arctic ice]. Moscow: 
BARR, W. 1978. The voyage  ofSibiryakov, 1932. Polar Record 19(120): 253-264. 
BELOV, M. I .  1969. Nauchnoye i khozyaystvennoye osvoyeniye Sovetskogo Severa. Istoriya 
otkrytiya i osvoyeniya  Severnogo  Morskogo  Puti,  tom IV [Scientific and  economic 
exploitation of the Soviet  North. The history of the  discovery  and exploitation of the Northern 
Sea  Route, vol. IV]. Leningrad: Gidrometeorologicheskoye Izdatel’stvo. 
BURKHANOV, V. F. 1959. A distinguished northern explorer. In: Otto Yul’yevich Shmidt: 
zhizn’ i deyatelnost’ [Otto Yul’yevich Shmidt: his life and activities]. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
Akademii Nauk. pp. 223-250. 
BUYNITSKIY, V. Kh. 1945.  812 dney v dreyfuyushchikh I’dakh: dnevnik. [812 days in the 
drifting  ice: a journal]. Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo  Glavsevmorputi. 
GAKKEL’, Ya. Ya. 1936. The voyage of Vantsetti and I s k m .  Byulleten’ Arkticheskogo  Instituta 
GAKKEL’, Ya. Ya. 1938. The 1937 arctic navigation season. Problemy  Arktiki 1: 117-134. 
RUZOV, L. V. 1957. Na sushe i na more v Arktike [By land and sea in the Arctic]. Moscow: 
SHMIDT, 0. YU, et al. 1935. The voyage of the Chelyuskin. London:  Chatto  and Windus. 
SHTEPENKO, A. P. 1953. Zapiski shturmana  [Notes of a navigator]. MOSCOW: 
Gosudarstvennoye  Izdatel’stvo Geograficheskoy Literatury. 
SIMMONS, G. 1965. Target Arctic: men in the skies at  the top of the world. Philadelphia and 
New York: Chilton Books. 
STEPANOV, N. P. 1941. Zimovka 1937 goda. In: Arkticheskiye navigatsii [Arctic navigation 
seasons]. N. N. Zubov,  ed. Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo  Glavsevmorputi.  pp. 259-264. 
STOROZHEV,  N. M. 1940a. Gidrologicheskiye raboty  na dreyfuyushchikh I’dakh [Hydrological 
work on the drifting ice].  Leningrad-Moscow: Izdatel’stvo  Glavsevmorputi. 
STOROZHEV, N.  M. 1940b. Ice drift in  the  Laptev Sea under the influence of tidal phenomena. 
Problemy Arktiki 3:  69-83. 
ZALESSKIY, N. A. 1972. The Russian Northern Fleet during World War I and the Civil War. 
Letopis’  Severa 6: 130-161. 
VIZE,  V.  YU. 1946. Na “Sibiryakove”  i  “Litke”  cherez  ledovityye morya [On board Sibiryakov 
and Litke through icy seas]. Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Glavsevmorputi. 
ZINGER, M. E. 1948, V bitve za Sever [In the battle for the North]. Moscow-Leningrad: 
Izdatel’stvo Glavsevmorputi. 
Passage. Cambridge: Scott  Polar  Research  Institute. 
‘Molodaya gvardiya’. 
1~14-16. 
Izdatel’stvo “Morskoy Transport”. 
